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Abstract
This paper considers the impact of ambiguity in strategic situations. It extends the earlier
literature by allowing for optimistic responses to ambiguity. Ambiguity is modelled by CEU
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This paper considers the impact of ambiguity on systems of agents who interact in the presence of
strategic complementarity. There are many examples of such systems in economics, in particular
it can be seen as a stylized representation of …nancial contagion.
Ambiguity describes situations where individuals cannot or do not assign subjective prob-
abilities to uncertain events. In contrast we shall use risk to refer to situations where the
decision-maker is familiar with the relevant probabilities. Theoretical models of the impact of
ambiguity on individual decisions can be found in Gilboa and Schmeidler [29], Sarin and Wakker
[50] or Schmeidler [51]. In Eichberger and Kelsey [15] we studied games of strategic complements
or substitutes where players were ambiguity-averse.1 In particular we showed that in games of
strategic complements, the comparative statics of ambiguity made testable predictions.2 In
games of positive externalities and strategic complements, an increase in ambiguity-aversion
has the e¤ect of decreasing equilibrium strategies. A possible criticism of the previous lit-
erature is that experimental evidence shows individuals are not uniformly ambiguity-averse.3
While ambiguity-aversion is common, individuals do at times display ambiguity-preference. The
present paper aims to study the case where individuals may (but are not required to) express
ambiguity-preference.
There is a substantial body of experimental evidence which suggests that people behave
di¤erently in the presence of ambiguity than in situations where probabilities are well de…ned,
(Camerer and Weber [5]). The importance of the distinction between risk and ambiguity is
con…rmed by research, which shows that di¤erent parts of the brain process ambiguity and
probabilistic risk, see Camerer, Lowenstein, and Prelec [6]. The majority of individuals respond
by behaving cautiously when there is ambiguity. Henceforth we shall refer to such cautious
behaviour as ambiguity-aversion. In experiments a minority of individuals behave in the opposite
way which we shall refer to as ambiguity-preference, (Kilka and Weber [38]). Moreover the same
1This built on an earlier literature on games with ambiguity initiated by Dow and Werlang [12] and developed
in Eichberger and Kelsey [17].
2In this paper we considered games with an ordering on the strategy space. There is strategic complementarity
if when one player increases his/her strategy this gives other players an incentive to increase their strategies.
3One exception is Marinacci [42], who assumes that players either display global ambiguity-aversion or global
ambiguity-preference. However the evidence shows that the same individual can express ambiguity-preference in
some situations and ambiguity-aversion in others. We consider such mixed ambiguity attitudes.
2individual may express both ambiguity-preference and ambiguity aversion in di¤erent contexts.
The experimental evidence shows that in situations of unknown probabilities there is neither
uniform ambiguity-aversion nor uniform ambiguity-preference. Rather the subjective weights
attached to events has an inverse-S shape, (Kilka and Weber [38]).4 This implies that there is
ambiguity-seeking for relatively unlikely events and ambiguity-aversion for more likely events,
(Abdellaoui, Vossmann, and Weber [1], Kilka and Weber [38] and Wu and Gonzalez [55]).
1.2 Ambiguity in Games
In this paper we examine the impact of ambiguity in games with positive externalities and
increasing di¤erences. Ambiguity is modelled by Choquet expected utility (henceforth CEU),
Schmeidler [51]. The paper extends the previous literature on ambiguity and strategic inter-
action by considering both a larger class of games and a larger class of preferences than the
extant literature. In particular we allow for optimistic responses to ambiguity. As we shall
argue, previous notions of equilibrium and the support of a capacity have explicitly or implicitly
assumed ambiguity-aversion. Hence they may not be suitable for situations in which players
may express ambiguity-preference. We propose a new de…nition of support, which we believe is
more appropriate, and use it as the basis of an equilibrium concept for games with ambiguity.
This solution concept allows us to study the comparative statics of ambiguity-attitude. We
…nd that an increase in optimism has the e¤ect of increasing the equilibrium strategy. If a
given player is optimistic, (s)he places more weight on good outcomes than an expected utility
maximiser would. In this case, good outcomes would be perceived to be situations where other
players use high strategies. Increasing di¤erences is a form of strategic complementarity, which
implies that over-weighting high strategies will increase the given player’s incentive to play a
higher strategy. Thus the combination of an increase in optimism and increasing di¤erences
will increase the best response of any given individual and hence the equilibrium strategy.
Strategic complementarity can lead to multiple equilibria. In this case we can show that
if there is su¢cient ambiguity, equilibrium will be unique. If agents are su¢ciently optimistic
(resp. pessimistic) this equilibrium will be higher (resp. lower) than the highest (resp. low-
est) equilibria without ambiguity. Note that ambiguity and ambiguity-attitude have distinct
4This comment is heuristic rather than precise. It is only possible to represent the decision-weights graphically
if one restricts attention to a one-dimensional sub-family of events.
3e¤ects. Ambiguity causes the set of equilibria to collapse to a single equilibrium, while an
increase/decrease) in optimism causes the set of equilibria to move up (down).
1.3 Applications
Allowing for optimism is useful, since it allows us to model phenomena where ambiguity-
preference plays an important role in motivating behaviour. This might include setting up
small businesses, speculative research and development and decisions to enter careers such as
acting or rock music where the returns are very uncertain. As an example of potential applica-
tions we consider the weakest link public goods model.
It has long been suspected that ambiguity plays an important role in …nancial markets,
especially during bank runs, stock market booms and crashes. Keynes [37] spoke of ‘waves of
optimism and pessimism’. Ambiguity-aversion can be used to model some of these phenomena,
for instance the model of bank runs in Eichberger and Spanjers [18]. However it seems clear that
we need to allow for ambiguity-loving behaviour if we wish to model asset bubbles. One could
argue that the …nancial system has multiple equilibria, one with a high level of activity and high
asset values and one with a low level of activity and low asset values. Strategic complementarity
is present since higher asset values increase the extent to which …nancial assets can be used as
collateral. Optimism may have played a part in the asset price in‡ation which preceded the
recent …nancial collapse. One factor in the credit crunch may have been an increased perception
of ambiguity arising from doubts about the value of complex derivative securities. Combined
with an increase in pessimism this would have had a negative impact on the …nancial system.
This is not to deny that there are also real causes of the banking crisis. However changes in the
perceptions of ambiguity and attitudes to it, may well have played a part in the …nancial crisis
and the boom which preceded it. This may have been ampli…ed by the interaction between
ambiguity and strategic complementarity.
Ambiguity preference is also useful for explaining experimental results. Experimental evi-
dence rarely …nds behaviour which is uniformly ambiguity-averse. For instance Goeree and Holt
[30] have an experimental study of ten games. In each they have a “treasure” treatment for
which the evidence strongly supports Nash equilibrium. However they also have a “contradic-
tion treatment” in which an apparently irrelevant parameter is changed. In this treatment, the
experimental evidence is quite strikingly inconsistent with Nash predictions. In Eichberger and
4Kelsey [16] we show that many of these experimental results can be explained by the hypothesis
that players view their opponents’ behaviour as ambiguous. Optimistic attitudes to ambiguity
form an essential part of our explanation. It is clear that in Goeree and Holt [30]’s experiments
subjects are over-weighting high as well as low outcomes. This can be explained by ambiguity
if one allows for the possibility of ambiguity-preference.
Organization of the Paper In section 2 we present our framework and de…nitions. In section
3 we introduce our solution concept and prove existence of equilibrium. In section 4 we derive
the comparative statics of changes of ambiguity-attitude in games of strategic complements.
An application to the weakest link public goods model is discussed in section 5 and concluding
comments are in Section 7. Appendix A relates a number of alternative notions of the support
of a capacity, some examples of equilibrium under ambiguity can be found in Appendix B and
Appendix C contains the proofs of those results not proved in the text.
2 MODELLING AMBIGUITY IN GAMES
We consider a game ￿ = hN;(Si); (ui) : 1 6 i 6 ni with …nite pure strategy sets Si for each
player and payo¤ functions ui (si;s￿i). The notation, s￿i; indicates a strategy combination
for all players except i. The space of all strategy pro…les for i’s opponents is denoted by S￿i.
The space of all strategy pro…les is denoted by S: Player i has utility function ui : S ! R; for
i = 1;:::;n:
We want to model ambiguity about the possible behaviour of a player’s opponents. For
ambiguity-averse players, Choquet Expected Utility (henceforth CEU) provides a suitable rep-
resentation for choice under ambiguity. In this case, Schmeidler [51] proves that CEU can also
be viewed as a multiple-prior representation of expected utility (MEU) which was axiomatized
by Gilboa and Schmeidler [29]. This property allows us to interpret CEU as ignorance about
the true probability distribution.
In the following subsections, we relax the assumption of ambiguity-aversion. For a certain
class of beliefs, the CEU model coincides with the ￿-multiple prior expected utility model (￿-
MEU). Though there is no behavioural axiomatization of the latter model,5 it o¤ers a natural
5For the special case, where ambiguity is restricted to the categories of certainty, possibility, and impossibility,
Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant [7] provide an axiomatization in the Savage framework. In Ghirardato,
Maccheroni, and Marinacci [28] a sub-class of ￿-MEU preferences over in…nite state spaces is axiomatized. See
5distinction between ambiguity and ambiguity-attitude, be it optimistic or pessimistic.
2.1 Non-Additive Beliefs and Choquet Integrals
The CEU model of ambiguity represents beliefs as capacities. A capacity assigns non-additive
weights to subsets of S￿i. Formally, they are de…ned as follows.
De…nition 2.1 A capacity on S￿i is a real-valued function ￿ on the subsets of S￿i such that
A ￿ B ) ￿ (A) 6 ￿ (B) and ￿ (?) = 0; ￿ (S￿i) = 1:
Thus a capacity is like a subjective probability except that it may be non-additive.
If beliefs are represented by a capacity ￿i on S￿i, the expected utility of the payo¤ obtained
from a given act can be found using the Choquet integral, which is de…ned below.
De…nition 2.2 The Choquet integral of ui (si;s￿i) with respect to capacity ￿ on S￿i is:
Vi (si) =
Z
















































A simple, though extreme, example is the complete uncertainty capacity de…ned below.
Example 2.1 The complete uncertainty capacity, ￿0 on S￿i is de…ned by ￿0 (S￿i) = 1;=
￿0 (A) = 0 for all A $ S￿i:
Intuitively ￿0 describes a situation where the decision maker knows which states are possible
but has no further information about their likelihood. At the other extreme is an additive prob-
ability distribution which satis…es ￿(A[B) = ￿(A)+￿(B)￿￿(A\B) for any A;B ￿ S: One can
view complete uncertainty as describing the case where there is the greatest possible ambiguity.
In contrast, an additive probability describes a situation in which the true probabilities are
known with certainty, i.e. there is no ambiguity. (Alternatively if individuals’ subjective beliefs
are additive, they behave as if they knew the probabilities without doubt.) Further examples
will be provided throughout this paper.
also Eichberger, Grant, Kelsey, and Koshevoy [20] for an example of preferences which satisfy their axioms.
6De…nition 2.3 A capacity, ￿; is said to be convex if ￿(A [ B) > ￿(A) + ￿(B) ￿ ￿(A \ B):
Convex capacities can be associated in a natural way with a set of probability distributions
called core of the capacity.
De…nition 2.4 Let ￿ be a capacity on S￿i: The core, C (￿); is de…ned by s￿i
C (￿) = fp 2 ￿(S￿i);8A ￿ S￿i;p(A) > ￿ (A)g:
The core of a convex capacity is always non-empty. Due to ambiguity, a given player may not
be able to assign a single probability over his/her opponents’ strategy spaces which represents
that player’s beliefs. Instead (s)he considers a number of probability distributions to be possible.
The core is the closed convex hull of this set of probabilities. The capacity ￿ in Example 2.1
is convex and has the set of all probability distributions as its core, C (￿) = ￿(S￿i); which
explains the name complete uncertainty capacity.
For convex capacities, one can interpret the core of the capacity as upper bounds on the
probabilities of events. Below we de…ne the dual capacity which can be associated with an
arbitrary capacity. The capacity and its dual provide alternative representation of the same
information.
De…nition 2.5 Let ￿ be a capacity on S￿i and denote by :A := S￿inA the complement of the
event A: The dual capacity ￿ on S is de…ned by ￿ (A) = 1 ￿ ￿ (:A):
The capacity and its dual encode the same information. For a convex capacity ￿, any





Notice that, for a convex capacity, ￿(A) 6 ￿(A) := 1 ￿ ￿(:A) holds for any A ￿ S￿i: If the
inequality is an equality for all A in S￿i; then ￿ is a probability distribution. Since a capacity
and its dual represent upper and lower bounds for the probability distributions in the core of a
convex capacity it is natural to de…ne the degree of ambiguity of a player as follows.
De…nition 2.6 Let ￿ be a convex capacity on S￿i: De…ne the maximal (resp. minimal) degrees
7of ambiguity of ￿ by:
￿(￿) = maxf￿(:A) ￿ ￿(A) : ? $ A $ S￿ig;
￿ (￿) = minf￿(:A) ￿ ￿(A) : ? $ A $ S￿ig:
The maximal and minimal degrees of ambiguity provide upper and lower bounds on the
amount of ambiguity which the decision-maker perceives. These de…nitions are adapted from
Dow and Werlang [14]. They are justi…ed epistemically in Mukerji [45]. The degrees of ambiguity
are measures of the deviation from (binary) additivity. For an additive probability they are equal
to zero, while for complete uncertainty (Example 2.1) they are equal to one. These two examples
are the extreme cases with the highest and lowest degrees of ambiguity. Convex capacities have
degrees of ambiguity between these two cases.
The following result shows that for a convex capacity, the Choquet integral of a pay-o¤
function ui for a given strategy si is equal to the minimum over the core of the expected value
over ui: Hence convex capacities provide an attractive representation of pessimism. When a
decision-maker does not know the true probabilities, (s)he considers a set of probabilities to be
possible and evaluates any given act by the least favourable of these probabilities.
Proposition 2.1 (Schmeidler [51]) If ￿ is an convex capacity on S￿i; then
Z
ui (si;s￿i)d￿ = min
p2C(￿)
Epui (si;s￿i);
where E denotes the expected value of ui with respect to the additive probability p on S￿i:
Indeed, Schmeidler [51] argues that convex capacities represent ambiguity-aversion. More
recently Wakker [54] has shown that convexity is implied by a generalized version of the Allais
paradox. This provides another reason to take convex capacities as a representation of ambiguity
and the Choquet expected utility as the pessimistic evaluation of acts given this ambiguity.
2.2 Optimism, Pessimism, and JP-Capacities
Most of the literature on decision making under ambiguity deals with the case of ambiguity-
averse decision makers. In particular, most applications to strategic ambiguity in games have
8used this premise.6 As argued in the introduction, there is evidence that some individuals
respond to ambiguity in an optimistic way. In this paper, we would like to provide an extension
of the CEU and multiple prior approaches to games with optimistic as well as pessimistic players.
To achieve such an extension will require us to develop concepts for distinguishing ambiguity
from ambiguity-attitudes, which are not readily available in the literature. In particular, to our
knowledge there is no axiomatic treatment in the Savage approach which o¤ers a behaviourally
based distinction between ambiguity and ambiguity-attitudes. The CEU model, which relies on
convex capacities to model ambiguity, and the minimum expected utility approach of Gilboa
and Schmeidler [29] are derived using “ambiguity-aversion” as an axiom. The CEU approach is
applicable to general capacities, but for non-convex capacities, the separation between ambiguity
and ambiguity-attitude is not clear. A general capacity combines elements which one can
interpret as ambiguity or ambiguity-attitude.
In order to deal with this problem in the spirit of Schmeidler [51], we restrict attention
to a class of capacities introduced …rst by Ja¤ray and Philippe [35] which we will refer to as
JP-capacities. These were originally proposed in the context of a statistical model with upper
and lower probabilities. We believe that they are useful for representing ambiguity in games
since they are capable of modelling both optimism and pessimism. Recall that ￿ denotes the
dual capacity of ￿:
De…nition 2.7 A capacity ￿ on S￿i is a JP-capacity if there exists a convex capacity ￿ and
￿ 2 [0;1]; such that ￿ = ￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿:
As in Schmeidler [51], ambiguity is represented by a convex capacity ￿ and its core. The new
capacity proposed in Ja¤ray and Philippe [35] is a convex combination of the capacity ￿ and its
dual. As the following proposition shows, the CEU of a JP-capacity is a convex combination of
the minimum and the maximum expected utility over the set of probabilities in the core of ￿.
Proposition 2.2 (Ja¤ray and Philippe [35]) The CEU of a utility function ui with respect to
a JP-capacity ￿ = ￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ on S￿i is:
Z
ui (si;s￿i)d￿ (s￿i) = ￿ min
p2C(￿)
Epui (si;s￿i) + (1 ￿ ￿) max
p2C(￿)
Epui (si;s￿i):
6There are, however, a few exceptions including, Eichberger, Kelsey, and Schipper [21], and Marinacci [42].
9This results suggests an interpretation of the parameter ￿ as a degree of pessimism, as it
gives a weight to the worst expected utility the player could expect from the strategy si: If
￿ = 1; then we obtain the MEU model axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler [29]. On the
other hand, the weight (1￿￿) given to the best expected utility which a player can obtain with
the strategy si provides a natural measure for the optimism of a player. For ￿ = 1 we deal with
a pure optimist, while in general for ￿ 2 (0;1); the player’s preferences have both optimistic
and pessimistic features.
If preferences can be represented as a Choquet integral with respect to a JP capacity then
they lie in the intersection of the CEU and ￿-MEU models. The ￿-MEU model was formally
de…ned by Marinacci [41]. It is an extension of the well known Hurwicz preferences.7 If beliefs
may be represented by JP-capacities perceived ambiguity is represented by the capacity ￿,
while ambiguity-attitude is represented by ￿: Hence JP capacities allow a distinction between
ambiguity and ambiguity-attitude, which is formalized in the following de…nitions.8
De…nition 2.8 Let ￿ and ￿0 be two capacities on S: We say that ￿ is more pessimistic than ￿0
if for all A ￿ S;￿ (A) 6 ￿0 (A):
The following result shows that for JP-capacities, an increase in ￿ implies an increase in
pessimism.
Proposition 2.3 Suppose that ^ ￿ > ~ ￿ and ￿ is convex then ^ ￿ = ^ ￿￿ + (1 ￿ ^ ￿)￿ is more pes-
simistic than ~ ￿ = ~ ￿￿ + (1 ￿ ~ ￿)￿:
Proof. The result follows from noting that since ￿ is convex for all A ￿ S; ￿(A) 6 ￿(A):
A useful special case of JP-capacities is the neo-additive capacity, de…ned in Example 2.2,
which generates CEU preferences that display both optimism and pessimism.9
Example 2.2 Let ￿;￿ be real numbers such that 0 < ￿ < 1;0 < ￿ < 1; de…ne a neo-additive-
capacity ￿ on S￿i by
￿ (A) = ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (A);
7See, Arrow and Hurwicz [2], Hurwicz [34] and Hurwicz [33].
8Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci [28] present an alternative way to separate ambiguity and ambiguity-
attitude. However as we show in Eichberger, Grant, Kelsey, and Koshevoy [20] there are problems with this
approach, when the state space is …nite. The present paper only considers games with …nite strategy sets, which
is the equivalent of a …nite state space in their framework.
9Neo-additive is an abbreviation for non-extremal outcome additive. Neo-additive capacities are axiomatized
in Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant [7].
10for ; $ A $ S￿i; where ￿ is an additive probability distribution on S￿i:
The neo-additive capacity describes a situation where the decision maker’s ‘beliefs’ are rep-
resented by the probability distribution ￿: However (s)he has some doubts about these beliefs.
This ambiguity about the true probability distribution is re‡ected by the parameter ￿: The
highest possible level of ambiguity corresponds to ￿ = 1; while ￿ = 0 corresponds to no ambigu-
ity. The reaction to these doubts is in part pessimistic and in part optimistic. Higher levels of
￿ represent more ambiguity-aversion. Purely ambiguity-loving preferences are given by ￿ = 0;
while the highest level of ambiguity-aversion occurs when ￿ = 1: Hence, neo-additive prefer-
ences maintain a separation between ambiguity and ambiguity-attitude, which are measured by
￿ and ￿ respectively.
The Choquet expected value of a pay-o¤ function ui (si;￿) with respect to the neo-additive-
capacity ￿ is given by
Z
ui (si;s￿i)d￿ (s￿i) = ￿￿ min
s￿i2S￿i
ui (si;s￿i)+￿ (1 ￿ ￿) max
s￿i2S￿i
ui (si;s￿i)+(1￿￿)￿E￿ui (si;s￿i):
The Choquet integral for a neo-additive capacity is a weighted averaged of the highest payo¤, the
lowest payo¤ and an average payo¤. The response to ambiguity is partly optimistic represented
by the weight given to the best outcome and partly pessimistic. A neo-additive capacity can
be also viewed as a JP-capacity (see Proposition 3.2). In Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant
[7] it is shown that CEU preferences with neo-additive capacities can also be represented in the
following form:
Z
ui (si;s￿i)d￿ (s￿i) = ￿min
p2P
Epui (si;s￿i) + (1 ￿ ￿)max
p2P
Epui (si;s￿i);
where P =fp 2 ￿(S￿i) : p ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿g := C ((1 ￿ ￿)￿): Thus, P is the core of the convex
capacity ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)￿; i.e., the set of measures ‘centred’ around a …xed ￿ 2 ￿(S￿i):
Given the unresolved issues surrounding the question of how to distinguish ambiguity of
beliefs from ambiguity-attitudes,10 we restrict attention to JP-capacities where this distinc-
tion between ambiguity-attitude, as re‡ected by the parameter ￿; and ambiguous beliefs, as
represented by the convex part of the capacity ￿; appears uncontroversial. For economic and
10For more discussion of this issue compare Epstein [24] and Ghirardato and Marinacci [27].
11game-theoretic applications, this simple parametric separation will be particularly useful.
3 EQUILIBRIUM
Since the publication of Schmeidler [51], a number of solution concepts for games with ambiguity
and ambiguity-averse players have been proposed, see for instance Dow and Werlang [12], Lo
[40], Marinacci [42] and Ryan [48]. In all of these, the support of a player’s beliefs is used to
represent the set of strategies that (s)he believes his/her opponents will play. An equilibrium is
de…ned to occur when every pro…le of strategies in the support consists only of best responses.
The main di¤erence between the various solution concepts is that they use di¤erent support
notions.
Most of the literature deals with ambiguity-aversion or pessimism, in which case capacities
are convex. The Choquet integral computes the expected value with respect to capacity value
di¤erences in a decreasing order.11 Consider the case where the capacity is convex. The weight
on the best outcome is equal to its capacity, which can be seen as a lower bound on its probability.
The weight on the second highest outcome is the capacity of this event minus the capacity the
highest outcome, etc. Again this is the smallest weight which can be assigned to the second
highest outcome given what has already been assigned to the highest outcome. It can be seen
that this is a very cautious way of calculating an expectation. Hence convex capacities can be
viewed as a representation of ambiguous beliefs together with a pessimistic attitude towards
ambiguity. In this case, the support of a convex capacity is the appropriate concept for the
set of strategies which players believe their opponents will play. Moreover, we will argue in
this section (and prove in Appendix A) that the support notions, which were suggested in the
literature so far, will essentially coincide for convex capacities.
We propose to represent the set of strategies that a player believes his/her opponents will play
also by the support of a capacity. In general, capacities re‡ect both ambiguity and ambiguity-
attitudes. It is therefore necessary to separate ambiguity-attitudes from the ambiguous beliefs
part of a capacity in order to …nd an appropriate support notion. Applying support notions,
which work well in the context of convex capacities, to non-convex capacities risks confounding
ambiguity-attitude and beliefs. As a result they may suggest that all strategy pro…les of the
11One can de…ne a dual version of the Choquet integral based on the lower level sets. In this case, a convex
capacity would represent optimistic attitudes (see, e.g., Denneberg [11]).
12opponents lie in the support. For JP-capacities, which we introduced in the previous section,
the convex capacity ￿ on which a JP-capacity is based provides a consistent representation of
beliefs. In the following section we discuss the support of ambiguous beliefs, which is a key
concept for de…ning equilibrium in games.
A second problem needs to be addressed for a satisfactory notion of equilibrium under strate-
gic ambiguity. In game theory, it is common to assume that each player believes that his/her
opponents act independently. The notion of an equilibrium in mixed strategies of the standard
Nash equilibrium approach builds on the natural notion of “independent beliefs” provided by
the unique product of additive measures. It is well known (Lo [39], Hendon, Jacobsen, Sloth,
and Tranaes [32]) that there is no equivalent obvious product notion for ambiguous beliefs. Lo
[39], therefore, argues strongly for giving up the “independent beliefs” notion in models with
ambiguity. We will indicate below how one can model independent beliefs by the Möbius prod-
uct capacity,12 similar to the treatment in Eichberger and Kelsey [17]. The discussion of this
issue and the formal de…nition of an Equilibrium under Ambiguity (EUA) will form the second
part of the next section.
CEU-payo¤ functions of players with optimistic attitudes towards ambiguity will not be
quasi-concave. Hence, proving existence of an equilibrium by Kakutani’s …x-point theorem is
no longer feasible. There are, however, large and for economic applications important classes of
games for which general existence theorems can be proved. In the last part of this section, we
show existence of equilibrium for games with strategic complements.
3.1 Support of Ambiguous Beliefs
It is not possible to apply de…nitions of the support from the literature unmodi…ed since
many of them have implicitly assumed ambiguity-aversion. Two de…nitions have been used
for ambiguity-averse or pessimistic players with convex capacities, the Dow-Werlang (DW)
support (Dow and Werlang [12]) and Marinacci (M) support (Marinacci [42]).
The DW-support of the capacity ￿; suppDW ￿ is a set E ￿ S￿i; such that ￿ (S￿inE) = 0
and ￿ (F) > 0, for all F such that S￿inE $ F. This de…nition has the advantage that there
always exists a support, however it may not be unique. For example, the capacity of complete
12Technically we need to assume that the convex part of a JP-capacity ￿ is a Möbius independent product
of belief functions de…ned on the marginals. For a de…nition of the Möbius independent product and further
discussion see Ghirardato [26].
13uncertainty in Example 2.1, fsg is a support for any s 2 S￿i: In a slight abuse of notation, we
therefore denote by suppDW ￿ the set of all DW-supports.
Marinacci [42] de…nes the support of a capacity ￿ to be the set of states with positive capacity.
Formally, the M-support of capacity ￿; is de…ned by suppM ￿ = fs 2 S￿i : ￿ (s) > 0g: Provided
it exists, suppM ￿ is always unique. However there are capacities for which it is empty. Once
again, the complete uncertainty capacity in Example 2.1 can serve as an example. In Appendix
A (Proposition A.1) we show that, for convex capacities, suppDW ￿ = suppM ￿ holds, whenever
the DW-support is unique.
Based on knowledge concepts from Morris [44], Ryan [48] discusses several notions of a
support for ambiguous beliefs which are represented by multiple priors.13 Since the Choquet
expected utility of a convex capacity can also be represented as a multiple-priors functional,
where the set of priors is given by the core of the convex capacity, these support notions can be
applied to CEU where ambiguous beliefs are modelled by convex capacities.
For a set P ￿ ￿(S￿i) of multiple priors, Ryan [48] (page 56) de…nes a strong support of P
as
S
p2P suppp and a weak support of P as
T
p2P suppp, where suppp denotes the standard
notion of a support for additive probability distributions. The strong support of the set of
probability distributions P comprises the strategy combinations of the opponents which have a
positive probability under some probability distribution in the set of priors P; while the weak
support contains all strategy combinations which have a positive probability for all probability
distributions in P: The strong notion of support will never be empty, but will equal the set S￿i
if there is at least one probability distribution which has full support. On the other hand, the
weak support may well be empty.
We prove in Appendix A that, for convex capacities, the support concepts of Dow and
Werlang [12] and Marinacci [42] coincide with the weak support notion of Ryan [48] if the DW-
support is unique. We believe that this consistency of the support notions for multiple priors
and capacities is a strong argument for using this support notion for convex capacities.
13Ryan [48] discusses these notions in a model where decision makers have lexicographically ordered beliefs.
In this context, Ryan [48] introduces the concept of …rm beliefs which coincides with our support notion for the
non-lexicographic versions of the CEU and MEU models. An earlier unpublished paper, Ryan [47], contains a
similar discussion in the more familiar context of CEU and MEU. In a recent paper, Epstein and Marinacci [23]
study the property of “mutual absolute continuity” of all probability distributions in the set of priors. It is easy
to see that for …nite state spaces this property holds if and only if strong and weak support coincide.




De…nition 3.1 applies the de…nition of a weak support from Ryan [48] to the set of probabili-
ties in the core of the convex capacity ￿: Though the core of ￿ is never empty, the intersection of
the supports of the probability distributions in it may well be empty. Once again, the capacity
of complete uncertainty in Example 2.1 can serve as an example. In this case, the core of the
capacity is the set of all probability distributions on S￿i; ￿(S￿i); but the intersection of the
supports of the probability distributions in ￿(S￿i) is empty.
Though the support de…ned in equation (1) is a suitable concept for a convex capacity
representing the beliefs of the decision-maker, as argued above, this notion is not necessarily
adequate for non-convex capacities which represent ambiguity attitudes as well. As an example
consider the neo-additive capacity ￿ = ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ as in Example 2.2. For ￿ < 1;
suppDW ￿ = suppM ￿ = S￿i and supp￿ = S￿i as long as the core of ￿ is not empty. This is
not suitable as a support notion for the neo-additive capacity as it does not make a distinction
between those strategies the players believe are possible for his/her opponents and others.
The problem lies in the fact that neither of these support notions distinguishes between
ambiguous beliefs and the decision makers’ attitudes towards this ambiguity. For JP-capacities,
which are the class of capacities studied in this paper, we propose a support notion which relates
only to the convex part ￿:
De…nition 3.2 If ￿ = ￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ is a JP-capacity on S￿i; we de…ne the support of
￿;suppJP ￿; by supp￿JP=supp￿:
Next we consider whether the support of a JP-capacity is unique. It is easy to show that
the support of the convex capacity ￿ is unique, see Proposition A.3. However it is possible
that a JP-capacity ￿JP may have two di¤erent representations; ￿JP = ￿0￿0 + (1 ￿ ￿0) ~ ￿0 =
￿00￿00 + (1 ￿ ￿00) ~ ￿00; with ￿0;￿00 convex and supp￿0 6= supp￿00: The following result shows that
this cannot happen.
Proposition 3.1 If ￿JP is a JP-capacity on S￿i then the support of ￿;suppJP ￿;is unique.
15Neo-additive capacities introduced in Example 2.2 provide an easy and intuitive example
for the support of JP-capacities. For such capacities, where the implied set of priors is a ￿-
neighbourhood of an additive probability ￿; we can show the JP-support equals the support of
￿: This is proved in the following result which also …nds the maximal and minimal degrees of
ambiguity for a neo-additive capacity.
Proposition 3.2 Let ￿ = ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ be a neo-additive capacity on S￿i. Then:
1. ￿ may be written in the form ￿ = ￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿; where ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (A) + ￿￿0 (A);
(Recall ￿0 denotes the complete uncertainty capacity);
2. The maximal and minimal degrees of ambiguity of ￿ are ￿(￿) = ￿ (￿) = ￿ respectively;
3. suppJP ￿ = supp￿:
Recall we interpret a neo additive capacity as describing a situation where the decision-
maker’s beliefs are represented by the additive probability distribution ￿; however (s)he may
lack con…dence in this belief. Given this, it seems intuitive that the support of the neo-additive
capacity should coincide with the support of ￿: This provides an argument in favour of our
de…nition of support, since it con…rms our intuition in this case.
3.2 Independent Beliefs and Equilibrium under Ambiguity
In analogy to a Nash equilibrium we de…ne an Equilibrium Under Ambiguity (EUA) to be a
situation where each player maximizes his/her (Choquet) expected utility given his/her beliefs
about the behaviour of his/her opponents. In addition, beliefs have to be reasonable in the
sense that each player believes that his/her opponents play best responses. We interpret this
as implying that the support of any given player’s beliefs should not be empty and consist only
of best responses of the other players. Let Ri(￿i) = argmaxsi2Si
R
ui (si;s￿i)d￿i (s￿i)g denote
the best response correspondence of player i given beliefs ￿i:
De…nition 3.3 An n-tuple of capacities ^ ￿ = h^ ￿1;:::;^ ￿ni is an Equilibrium Under Ambiguity if
for all players i 2 I;
? 6= supp^ ￿i ￿ ￿
j6=i
Rj(^ ￿j):
16If for each player ^ si 2 supp^ ￿i; we say that ^ s = h^ s1;::::^ sni is an equilibrium strategy pro…le.
Moreover if for each player supp^ ￿i contains a single strategy pro…le ^ si we say that it is a pure
equilibrium, otherwise we say that it is mixed.
In equilibrium, the beliefs of player i are represented by a capacity ^ ￿i, whose support consists
of strategies that are best responses for the opponents. A player’s evaluation of a particular
strategy may, in part, depend on strategies of the opponents which do not lie in the support.
We interpret these as events a player views as unlikely but which cannot be ruled out. This
may re‡ect some doubts the player may have about the rationality of the opponents or whether
(s)he correctly understands the structure of the game.
Players choose pure strategies and do not randomize. A mixed equilibrium cannot be inter-
preted as a randomization. In a mixed equilibrium some player i will have two or more best
responses. The support of other players’ beliefs about i’s play, will contain some or all of them.
Thus an equilibrium, where the support contains multiple strategy pro…les, is an equilibrium
in beliefs rather than in mixed strategies. If the beliefs in an EUA happen to be additive in a
two-player game, then an EUA is a Nash equilibrium.
For games with more than two players, however, an EUA with additive beliefs will not be a
Nash equilibrium in general, since the Nash equilibrium concept implies two more properties:
(i) players are assumed to play independent strategies (independent choices) and
(ii) any two players hold the same beliefs regarding the other players’ choices (third-party
consistency).
These properties follow immediately from the Nash equilibrium requirement that beliefs
coincide with the (mixed) strategies actually played by the opponents. The independent choices
of mixed strategies de…ne a unique probability distribution on the product space of strategy
sets. Both conditions fail for EUA beliefs. In order to avoid these complications, many papers
restrict attention to two-player games.14
It is well-known (Hendon, Jacobsen, Sloth, and Tranaes [32], Denneberg [11] p. 53-56) that
there are several ways of extending the product of capacities from the Cartesian products of
the strategy sets to general subsets of the product space. One popular method is the Möbius
product capacity which uses the fact that belief functions or totally monotone capacities have a
14Lo [40] and Groes, Jacobsen, Sloth, and Tranaes [31] deal with n-player games. They use, however, a
conceptually di¤erent notion of equilibrium where players choose mixed strategies and hold non-additive beliefs
about the other players’ mixed strategy choices.
17unique representation by an additive probability distribution over events. For instance, Bailey,
Eichberger, and Kelsey [4] use this notion of a product for an application to public goods games.
The Möbius product, however, is well-de…ned only for belief functions.15 Hence, it cannot
be applied directly to JP-capacities which are not even convex in general. One possibility to
obtain a notion of independent beliefs would restrict the convex part ￿ of a JP-capacity to be
a belief function, apply the Möbius product and use the JP-capacity of the Möbius product of
￿ as the relevant product capacity16.
In the light of these complications, Lo [39] argues convincingly for considering correlation
in beliefs as the typical case under ambiguity. Some of the arguments for considering correlated
beliefs have been put forward already in the context of additive beliefs by Aumann [3]. If beliefs
are ambiguous these arguments gain even more force. To illustrate how correlated beliefs a¤ect
equilibrium beliefs of an EUA, we will consider an example from Aumann [3], which is also
discussed in Lo [39]. The EUA concept implies consistency of beliefs about a third player
only if they have unique maximizers. In contrast to Nash equilibrium, where players must
hold identical beliefs about the opponent’s equilibrium mixed strategy, EUA does not constrain
beliefs, as the following example illustrates.
Example 3.1 (Aumann [3], Example 2.3, p. 69) Consider the following three-player game
where Player 1 chooses the row, S1 = fU;Dg; Player 2 the column, S2 = fL;Rg, and Player 3














Player 3 will be indi¤erent about the choices X and Y no matter what beliefs (s)he holds. Any
Nash equilibrium of this game is of the form (D;L;fX;Y g), where fX;Y g stands for any mixed
15Belief functions, introduced by Dempster [10] and Shafer [52], also called totally monotone capacities, are a
special class of capacities with non-negative Möbius parameters.
16There are other notions of a product capacity which do not impose restrictions on the marginal capacities.
Denneberg [11] provides a good introduction to product capacities and further references to the related literature.
18strategy of Player 3, and yields pay-o¤s (1;1;1).
Aumann [3] argues that, conditional on X, Player 1 would be justi…ed to play U in response
to Player 2 choosing R; and, conditional on Y; Player 2 could optimally play R in reply to U
with pay-o¤s (3;3;3): Yet, this could be an equilibrium only if the behaviour of Player 1 and
Player 2 would be based on inconsistent beliefs about Player 3’s choice. According to Aumann
[3], such inconsistent beliefs could arise if players have subjective beliefs about a randomizing
device which Player 3 uses. For example, Player 3 may follow the strategy of choosing X if
there is sunshine and Y otherwise. If Player 1 believes that sunshine will occur with probability
1
4 and Player 2 assumes that the sun will shine with probability 3
4, then their choices of U and
R respectively, would be justi…ed.
Both types of behaviour can be EUA depending on the ambiguity-attitude of the players
and their degrees of ambiguity regarding the behaviour of their opponents. For parameters
(￿1;￿2;￿3) and (￿1;￿2;￿3) satisfying
3(1 ￿ ￿1) ￿ 5￿1￿1 ￿ 0; 3(1 ￿ ￿2) ￿ 5￿2￿2 ￿ 0; (2)
the neo-additive capacities (b ￿1;b ￿2;b ￿3) with
b ￿1((R;X)) = 1; b ￿2((U;Y )) = 1; b ￿3((U;R)) = 1;
are an EUA. If the conditions in equation (2) both fail, there are two pure EUA (e ￿1;e ￿2;e ￿3)
with
e ￿1((L;X)) = 1; e ￿2((D;X)) = 1; e ￿3((D;L)) = 1;
and (￿ ￿1;￿ ￿2;￿ ￿3) with
￿ ￿1((L;Y )) = 1; ￿ ￿2((D;Y )) = 1; ￿ ￿3((D;L)) = 1;
which correspond to the standard Nash equilibria of this game.
Firstly, notice that the correlated beliefs b ￿1((R;X)) = 1 and b ￿2((U;Y )) = 1 are consistent
with players assuming that their opponents choose an optimal strategy. They disagree, however,
about which optimal strategy Player 3 will choose. As Aumann [3] suggests this may be due to
19di¤ering beliefs about the randomizing device.
If beliefs are ambiguous there is even more room for disagreement about how players will
behave, if they do not have unique best replies. Note however that ambiguity-attitude may
in‡uence the choice of players. In Example 3.1 strong optimism, i.e., high values of ￿i may
induce behaviour as in the standard Nash equilibrium of the game.
3.3 Existence of Equilibrium for Games with Positive Externalities
Since preferences are not quasi-convex it is not possible to prove existence using standard …xed
point arguments. Instead we use lattice-theoretic techniques, which is why we require that the
pay-o¤ functions have increasing (or decreasing) di¤erences. An advantage is that we are able
to prove existence of a pure equilibrium. Moreover, in the next section, we will show several
comparative static results of changes in ambiguity and ambiguity-attitudes for this class of
games.
Given that we consider …nite strategy sets, we can identify strategy sets with an interval of
the integers, Si = fsi;si + 1;:::; ￿ sig; for i = 1;:::;n:17 The payo¤ function ui (si;s￿i) satis…es
increasing (resp. decreasing) di¤erences in hsi;s￿ii if when ^ si > ~ si; ui (^ si;s￿i) ￿ ui (~ si;s￿i)
is increasing (resp. decreasing) in s￿i: If ui (si;s￿i) satis…es increasing di¤erences in hsi;s￿ii
then it also has increasing di¤erences in hs￿i;sii.18 Increasing di¤erences implies that if a given
player perceives his/her opponents increase their strategy, then (s)he has an incentive to increase
his/her strategy as well. Hence it is a form of strategic complementarity. Bertrand oligopoly
with linear demand and constant marginal cost would be an example of a game with increasing
di¤erences.
De…nition 3.4 A game, ￿ = hN;(Si); (ui) : 1 6 i 6 ni; has positive externalities and increas-
ing di¤erences if ui (si;s￿i) is increasing in s￿i and has increasing di¤erences in hsi;s￿ii for
1 6 i 6 n:
Positive externalities and increasing di¤erences will be a maintained hypothesis throughout
the rest of the paper, i.e. we shall assume that all games satisfy it. Negative externalities may
be de…ned in an analogous way.
17The crucial part of this assumption is the restriction to a …nite strategy set. It would be straightforward to
extend the results to a multi-dimensional strategy space.
18See Topkis [53], p. 42.
20The following existence result is proved in Appendix C. Fix a vector of parameters ￿ =
(￿1;:::;￿n) 2 [0;1]n representing the ambiguity-attitudes of the players and maximal and min-
imal degrees of ambiguity (￿;￿) = ((￿1;￿1);:::(￿n;￿n)); 0 6 ￿i 6 ￿i 6 1; then there exists
an Equilibrium Under Ambiguity where players’ beliefs are represented by JP-capacities with
parameters ￿ and convex parts ￿i satisfying ￿i(￿) 6 ￿i and ￿i(￿) > ￿i:
Theorem 3.1 Let ￿ be a game of positive externalities and increasing di¤erences. Then for
any exogenously given n-tuples of ambiguity-attitudes ￿; maximal degrees of ambiguity ￿ and
minimal degrees of ambiguity ￿;;(￿ 6 ￿) the game ￿ has a pure equilibrium ￿ = h￿1;:::￿ni in
JP-capacities, where ￿i = ￿i￿i+(1 ￿ ￿i)￿i for 1 6 i 6 n: The convex capacity ￿i has; maximal
degree of ambiguity at most ￿i and minimal degree of ambiguity at least ￿i:
4 COMPARATIVE STATICS
In this section we investigate the comparative statics of changes in ambiguity-attitude on equi-
libria. Conducting comparative statics exercises is di¢cult because the capacity represents three
distinct concepts; the perceived ambiguity, the attitude to that ambiguity and the equilibrium
beliefs about the opponents’ strategies as represented by the support of the capacity. Moreover
these are interrelated. For instance if a player’s ambiguity-attitude changes this may cause
him/her to play a di¤erent strategy. The opponents are likely to respond by changing their
strategies, which would require the given player to change his/her beliefs so as to maintain
consistency.
Our aim is to investigate the comparative statics of ambiguity-attitude. To do this we need
to vary ambiguity-attitude while holding perceived ambiguity constant. We hold ambiguity
constant by placing exogenous bounds on the maximal and minimal degrees of ambiguity. (Our
comparative static results do not depend on the values of these bounds despite the fact they
are exogenous.)
To do this we strengthen positive externalities to the following assumption.
De…nition 4.1 A game, ￿; has positive aggregate externalities if ui (si;s￿i) = ui (si;fi (s￿i));
for 1 6 i 6 n, where ui is increasing in fi and fi : S￿i ! R is increasing in all arguments.
This is a separability assumption. It says that a player only cares about a one-dimensional
21aggregate of his/her opponents’ strategies. An example would be a situation of team production,
in which the utility of a given team member depends on his/her own labour input and the total
input supplied by all other members of the team.19 Negative aggregate externalities may be
de…ned in an analogous way.
4.1 Increasing Di¤erences
For games of positive aggregate externalities with increasing di¤erences, an increase in ambiguity-
aversion decreases equilibrium strategies. Intuitively if a given player becomes more ambiguity-
averse (s)he will place more weight on outcomes which are perceived as bad. If there are positive
externalities, a bad outcome would be when an opponent plays a low strategy. Since increasing
di¤erences is a form of strategic complementarity, if a given player increases the decision-weight
on low strategies of his/her opponents this will reduce his/her incentive to play a high strategy.
The following theorem is our comparative static result on games with increasing di¤erences.
It shows that an increase in pessimism will reduce the equilibrium strategies in games with
positive aggregate externalities and strategic complements. If there are multiple equilibria, the
strategies played in the highest and lowest equilibria will decrease. For this result, we assume
that the ambiguity-attitude of one player changes, the ambiguity-attitudes of other players and
the perceived ambiguity are held constant.
Theorem 4.1 Let ￿ be a game of positive aggregate externalities with increasing di¤erences.
Assume that beliefs are represented by JP capacities and let ￿ = h￿1;:::;￿ni denote the vector of
ambiguity attitudes. Let s(￿) (resp. ￿ s(￿)) denote the lowest (resp. highest) equilibrium strategy
pro…le when the minimal (resp. maximal) degree of ambiguity is ￿ (resp. ￿): Then s(￿) and
￿ s(￿) are decreasing functions of ￿:
Remark 1 The comparative statics are reversed in games of negative aggregate externalities;
for further details see Eichberger and Kelsey [15].
4.2 Multiple Equilibria
Strategic Complementarity can give rise to multiple Nash equilibria. Under some assumptions
we can show if there are multiple equilibria without ambiguity and there is su¢cient optimism
19For a more detailed analysis of the impact of ambiguity on team production see Kelsey and Spanjers [36].
22(resp. pessimism) equilibrium will be unique and will correspond to the highest (resp. lowest)
equilibrium without ambiguity. To prove this we need the following assumption.




have a unique maximizer, i.e.
￿
￿argmaxsi2Si ui (si; ￿ s￿i)
￿







This assumption is required for technical reasons. If the strategy space were continuous and
utility were concave in own strategy, it would be implied by our other assumptions. It says that
the gaps in the discrete strategy space do not fall in the wrong place. For pay-o¤ functions
which are not concave in own strategy the assumption is more restrictive. The following result is
a corollary of Theorem 4.1 and Lemma C.9. Note that the assumption of aggregate externalities
is not used in this result.
Proposition 4.1 Consider a game, ￿; of positive externalities with increasing di¤erences
which satis…es Assumption 4.1. There exist ￿ ￿ (resp. ￿), 0 < ￿ 6 ￿ ￿ < 1; and ￿ ￿ such that
if the minimal degree of ambiguity is ￿ (￿i) > ￿ ￿ and ￿i > ￿ ￿, (resp. 6 ￿) for 1 6 i 6 n;
equilibrium is unique and is smaller (resp. larger) than the smallest (resp. largest) equilibrium
without ambiguity.
Even when Assumption 4.1 is not satis…ed, Lemma C.9 shows that as ambiguity increases






+ (1 ￿ ￿i)ui (si; ￿ s￿i)
￿
: Thus the
equilibrium pay-o¤s will be unique even when the equilibrium beliefs and strategies are not. In
a game with increasing di¤erences and multiple Nash equilibria, increasing ambiguity causes
the multiplicity of equilibria to disappear, while increasing ambiguity-aversion causes the equi-
librium strategies to decrease. Thus ambiguity and ambiguity-attitude have distinct e¤ects.
Combined with su¢cient optimism, ambiguity can cause the economy to move to a higher level
equilibrium.
5 WEAKEST LINK PUBLIC GOODS
This section applies the preceding analysis to the weakest link model of public goods, (Cornes
and Sandler [9]). This concerns private provision of a public good. Each player has to decide
how much to contribute towards the production of a public good. The level of provision is
23equal to the minimum contribution rather than the total of individual contributions as in the
standard public goods problem. Possible applications include: a number of countries choosing
environmental legislation, if industry can relocate to the jurisdiction with the least restrictions
and a number of military commanders defending a border, where the enemy can choose the
most favourable point to attack.
There are two goods, a public good Y and a private good X and n individuals, 1 6 i 6 n.
Each chooses how much to contribute to the production of a public good. Individual i has
utility function vi (y;xi) = y ￿ cxi, where y denotes the level of public good provision and xi
denotes his/her contribution to the public good (in terms of private good). The marginal cost
of a contribution to the public good, is denoted by c; where 0 < c < 1: Contributions may only
take integer values in the range s 6 xi 6 ￿ s. Thus each player has a …nite set of pure strategies.
This assumption enables us to apply the results from section 4. Individuals are assumed to
have su¢ciently large endowments that they are able to contribute ￿ s. The level of public good
provision is given by the production function, y = minfx1;:::;xng. Thus the utility function
may be written in the form:
ui (xi;x￿i;c) = minfx1;:::;xng ￿ cxi:
If there is no ambiguity, Nash equilibrium is not unique. Any situation where all players make
the same contribution x￿ for any x￿;s 6 x￿ 6 ￿ s is a Nash equilibrium. Only the equilibrium
where all make the highest possible contribution ￿ s is e¢cient.
Ambiguity has the following e¤ect in this game. Pessimism will cause players to be concerned
that others will not contribute, which will render their own contributions useless. On the other
hand optimistic responses to ambiguity will encourage players to choose high strategies and
thus make it less likely that there will be an ine¢cient Nash equilibrium.
The following proposition describes the properties of the weakest-link public goods model.
Proposition 5.1 The weakest link public goods model is a game of positive aggregate external-
ities which satis…es Assumption 4.1. It has increasing di¤erences in hxi;x￿ii and decreasing
di¤erences in hxi;ci:
Proof. Positive aggregate externalities are immediate. To see that there are increasing dif-
24ferences in hxi;x￿ii, assume that ^ x￿i > ~ x￿i: Let ^ m = minj6=i f^ xigand ~ m = minj6=i f~ xig: Then
ui (xi; ^ x￿i;c) ￿ ui (xi; ~ x￿i;c) = minfxi; ^ x￿ig ￿ minfxi; ~ x￿ig = 0;s 6 xi 6 ~ m; xi ￿ ~ m; ~ m <
xi 6 ^ m; ^ m￿ ~ m; ^ m < xi; which is increasing in xi: If ^ c > ~ c; then ui (xi; ^ x￿i;^ c)￿ui (xi; ~ x￿i;~ c) =
xi (~ c ￿ ^ c); which is decreasing in xi: Assumption 4.1 holds because
￿







￿￿ ￿ = fsg:
The following result is a corollary of Theorem 4.1 and Proposition 5.1.20
Corollary 5.1 In the weakest link public goods model:
1. an increase in optimism will increase equilibrium strategies;
2. an increase in the cost of contributions, c; will decrease equilibrium strategies;
3. if the degree of ambiguity is su¢ciently high equilibrium will be unique.
Goeree and Holt [30] present an experimental study of the weakest link public goods model.
Their experiment was run as a one-shot game, which is likely to increase perceived ambiguity.
Despite the multiplicity of Nash equilibria they found that subjects tended to concentrate on
particular strategies. Subjects tended to play the highest (resp. lowest) strategy when c is low
(resp. high). This is compatible with our theoretical results. Optimistic responses to ambiguity
are required to explain why, at times, subjects tend to use the highest strategy. Ambiguity-
aversion alone could only explain a bias towards low strategies.
Secondly Goeree and Holt found that an increase in c tends to reduce equilibrium strategies.
This is despite the fact that Nash equilibrium predicts that c has no e¤ect on play, (provided c




Compared to our previous work, e.g. Eichberger and Kelsey [15], this paper makes a number of
innovations. Much of the contribution of the present paper involves developing techniques for
modelling optimistic responses to ambiguity. As a result the set of preferences used has been
20Part 2 is not strictly speaking a corollary. However it may be established by similar techniques.
25extended signi…cantly beyond the convex capacity model mainly used in the extant literature.
This extension has made new de…nitions of support and equilibrium necessary. This has enabled
us to distinguish between ambiguity and ambiguity-attitude. In our previous research, both
ambiguity and ambiguity-attitude were varied simultaneously in comparative static exercises.
(It is hard to avoid this in a model which assumes ambiguity-aversion.)
The present paper also studies a signi…cantly broader class of games than Eichberger and
Kelsey [15]. The earlier paper which restricted attention to symmetric games of aggregate
externalities where the utility function was concave in own strategy. The present paper does
not assume symmetry nor does it assume concavity in own strategy. Aggregate externalities
are only assumed for the comparative statics section.
6.2 Experimental Studies
There are a relatively small number of experimental studies of ambiguity in games of which we
are aware. Colman and Pulford [8] …nd evidence of ambiguity in games but do not test any
particular theory. Eichberger and Kelsey [15] predicted that ambiguity would have the opposite
e¤ect in games of strategic complements and substitutes. Eichberger, Kelsey, and Schipper
[19] found evidence to support this prediction. In Eichberger and Kelsey [15] we argue that
provided the bene…t function is concave, ambiguity will tend to increase contributions to public
goods. Mauro and Castro [43] experimentally tested this prediction and found generally positive
results. Overall we believe the existing experimental work broadly supports our conclusions.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper we have studied the impact of ambiguity in games. In particular we have ex-
tended previous work by proposing new de…nitions of support and equilibrium, which allow
for ambiguity-loving (optimistic) behaviour. Economic applications would include oligopoly
models, public goods and environmental problems. These issues are discussed in Eichberger
and Kelsey [15] and Eichberger, Kelsey, and Schipper [21].21 Most general comparative statics
results involve some form of strategic complementarity. Hence we believe that it will not be
possible to prove substantially more general results on the comparative statics of ambiguity in
21Some extensions of these results are in Fontini [25].
26games.
A natural extension would be to consider games with strategic substitutes. This is more
di¢cult since it has not been possible to prove general comparative static results for situations
of strategic substitutes. In our previous research, Eichberger and Kelsey [15] and Eichberger,
Kelsey, and Schipper [21] we have found results for two-person games and games of aggregate
externalities with strategic substitutes. However in both of these cases a game of strategic sub-
stitutes can be transformed to one of strategic complements by reinterpreting and/or reordering
the strategy spaces.
It is possible, in principle, to extend our results to extensive form games. However this
will pose some new conceptual problems. Since players will receive new information during the
course of play, it will be necessary to model how information is updated.
APPENDIX
A ALTERNATIVE NOTIONS OF SUPPORT
In Section 3.1 we introduced a support notion for convex capacities, supp￿; and a related notion
for non-convex JP-capacities, suppJP v: There we argued that, for convex capacities, the support
notion supp￿ is the most suitable concept because it coincides with all common de…nitions of
support in the literature. In this appendix we will substantiate these claims with some formal
results. Moreover, below we will prove Proposition 3.1 which shows that the concept of support
that we suggest for JP-capacities is well-de…ned.
For convex capacities, the CEU and MEU representations coincide. This allows for a natural
interpretation of a decision maker’s ambiguity in terms of the set of prior distributions. For a
set of priors there are essentially two notions of support possible. One can consider only those
states as part of the support which have positive probability in all probability distributions of
the set of priors, the weak support notion of Ryan [48], or one may de…ne the support as the set
of states which get positive probability in some probability distribution of the set of priors, the
strong support. As we will show in this appendix, almost all notions of support for capacities
coincide with the weak support notion of multiple priors if the capacity is convex.
27In the context of games, where states correspond to strategy combinations of the opponents.
The weak support notion appears as the natural choice because it does not require best-reply
behaviour against any strategy an opponent may possibly play but only against those which
are unquestionably played. The alternative notion of the strong support has been studied by
Dow and Werlang [13] and Lo [40]. Their work shows that solution concepts for games based
on this notion of support do not result in behaviour which is signi…cantly di¤erent to that in a
Nash equilibrium. The strong support notion seems, therefore, incompatible with the objective
of modelling deviations from Nash equilibrium due to ambiguity.
In the context of CEU, the support notion in De…nition 3.1 appears also recommended by
the role which the states of the weak support play for the decision weights in the Choquet
integral. Sarin and Wakker [49] argue that the decision-maker’s beliefs may be deduced from
these decision weights. Considering those states as candidates for the support which always
increase the decision weight of the outcome associated with it, one de…nes the set of decision-
weight increasing states of a capacity v;
B(￿) = fs 2 S￿i : 8A $ S￿i;s = 2 A;￿ (A [ s) > ￿ (A)g;
as the set of states which increase the capacity value of any event A they are joined with. Put
di¤erently, the set B(￿) consists of those states which always get positive weight in the Choquet
integral, no matter which act is being evaluated.22
The following Proposition shows that the notion of support suggested in De…nition 3.1
coincides with the M-support and the set of states which always receive positive weight in the
Choquet integral B(￿). Even the DW-support, which is in general non-unique, is closely related
to the support of De…nition 3.1 as Proposition A.1 and Proposition A.2 demonstrate.
Proposition A.1 For a convex capacity ￿ :
1. if suppDW is unique, then supp￿ = B(￿) = suppM ￿ = suppDW ￿;
2. otherwise, supp￿ = B(￿) = suppM ￿ ￿ suppDW ￿:
Proof. The proof of Proposition A.1 consists of three lemmata (below). Part 1 follows from
Lemma A.3 and Lemma A.2. Part 2 follows from Lemma A.3 and Lemma A.1.
22In an earlier draft we used B (￿) as our support notion. We obtained similar results to those reported in the
present paper. This suggests that our results are reasonably robust.
28Lemma A.1 If ￿ is a capacity then suppM ￿ ￿ suppDW ￿.
Proof. Let ~ s 2 suppM ￿ and suppose, if possible, ~ s = 2 suppDW ￿: Then 0 = ￿ (SnsuppDW ￿) >
￿ (~ s) > 0; which is a contradiction.
Lemma A.2 Let ￿ be a capacity on S￿i then suppDW ￿ is unique if and only if suppM ￿ is a
DW-support.
Proof. Suppose that suppDW ￿ is unique. Let E be a DW-support: By Lemma A.1, suppM ￿ ￿
E. Suppose, if possible, there exists ^ s 2 EnsuppM ￿; then ￿(^ s) = 0: Hence, F := S￿inf^ sg satis…es
￿(S￿inF) = 0: Let G be a minimal set such that G ￿ F and ￿(S￿inG) = 0: Then, G 6= E is
another DW-support which contradicts uniqueness. Hence suppM ￿ = suppDW ￿:
Now suppose suppM ￿ is a DW-support. Let F be an arbitrary DW-support. By Lemma
A.1, suppM ￿ ￿ F: Thus by the minimality part of the de…nition of a DW-support, we must
have F = suppM ￿; which gives uniqueness. The result follows.
Lemma A.3 If ￿ is an convex capacity with support supp￿; then supp￿ = suppM ￿ = B(￿):




supp￿ = supp￿: On the other hand, suppose s 2
T
￿2C(￿)
supp￿: Since ￿ is
convex, ￿(s) = min
￿2C(￿)
￿(s) > 0:24 Hence
T
￿2C(￿)
supp￿ ￿ suppM ￿:
Suppose s 2 suppM ￿: Then ￿(s) > 0: For any A ￿ S￿i; s = 2 A; by convexity of ￿; ￿(A[s) >
￿(A) + ￿(s) > ￿(A): Hence, s 2 B(￿): Conversely suppose s 2 B(￿); then ￿(s) = ￿(? [ s) >
￿(?) = 0: Hence, s 2 suppM ￿: Thus suppM ￿ = B(￿): The result follows.
The relationship between the di¤erent support notions becomes more clear if one considers
so-called null-additive capacities.25
De…nition A.1 A capacity ￿ is called null-additive i¤ ￿(E [ F) = ￿(E) for all F ￿ S￿i with
F \ E = ?; ￿(F) = 0 and E [ F 6= S￿i:
Proposition A.2 Let ￿ be a null-additive capacity on S￿i; then suppM ￿ = \
E2suppDW ￿
E:
23Recall C (￿) denotes the core of the capacity ￿; see De…nition 2.4.
24Although C (￿) is an in…nite set, the minimum must occur at one of the extremal points. The set of extremal
points of a core is …nite. Thus the minimum must be positive.
25Pap [46] studies null-additive capacities in detail.




E = ?; [
E2suppDW ￿
(S￿inE) = S￿i: Then
￿(S￿inE) = 0 for all E implies ￿(s) = 0 for all s 2 S￿i; i.e., suppM ￿ = ?:
Suppose s 2 E1 \ E2 \ ::: \ EK where Ek is a DW support of ￿ for 1 6 k 6 K: Then
￿(S￿inEk) = 0 and ￿(G) > 0 for all G such that S￿inEk & G; which implies ￿(S￿inEk[fsg) > 0:
Since ￿ is null-additive, ￿(S￿inEk [ fsg) = ￿(fsg) > 0; i.e., s 2 suppM ￿:
(ii) \
E2suppDW ￿
E ￿ suppM ￿: If suppM ￿ = ?, one has ￿(s) = 0 for all s 2 S￿i: Null-
additivity implies that ￿(E) = ￿( [
s2E
fsg) = 0 for all E & S￿i: In particular, for any s 2
S￿i; ￿(S￿ins) = 0 and F = S￿i is the unique set with positive capacity which includes S￿ins:
Hence, fsg 2 suppDW ￿ for all s 2 S￿i and \
E2suppDW ￿
E = ?:
Now consider the case where suppM ￿ 6= ?: Suppose s 2 suppM ￿ then ￿(s) > 0: Let E be an




If a capacity is null-additive, then the Marinacci support is the intersection of the DW-
supports and it is empty if and only if there are multiple DW-supports without a common
intersection.
Many capacities in economic applications are null-additive, e.g. neo-additive capacities26.
We do not suggest, however, to impose this condition in general. It does not appear to be
unusual for an ambiguous situation that a decision-maker may be able to express a likelihood
for an event but not for its sub-events. For example, in the Ellsberg three-colour urn (Ellsberg
[22]), where it is known that there are 30 red balls and 60 balls which are either black or yellow,
it appears natural to assume that the likelihood of the ball drawn being black or yellow is 2
3.
Yet, it does not follow that one can rule out that there are no black or no yellow balls in the urn.
This would imply capacity values, v(B) = v(Y ) = 0 and v(B [Y ) = 2
3 violating null-additivity.
Finally, we prove that the JP-support of ￿; suppJP; is unique.
Proof of Proposition 3.1: Suppose that ￿ = ￿0￿0 + (1 ￿ ￿0) ￿ ￿0 = ￿00￿00 + (1 ￿ ￿00) ￿ ￿00: The
case ￿0 = ￿00 is covered by Ja¤ray and Philippe [35], Proposition 2, so we shall assume ￿0 6= ￿00.
Let supp￿0 = A0;supp￿00 = A00 and supp￿0 [ supp￿00 = B:
Then ￿ (B) = ￿0￿0 (B) + (1 ￿ ￿0)[1 ￿ ￿0 (:B)] = ￿00￿00 (B) + (1 ￿ ￿00)[1 ￿ ￿00 (:B)]: Hence
￿00 ￿ ￿0 = ￿00￿00 (B) ￿ ￿0￿0 (B): (3)
26Condition (ii)(d) in Proposition 3.1 in Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant [7].
30Now ￿ (:B) = ￿0￿0 (:B) + (1 ￿ ￿0)[1 ￿ ￿0 (B)] = ￿00￿0 (:B) + (1 ￿ ￿00)[1 ￿ ￿00 (B)]
or (1 ￿ ￿0)[1 ￿ ￿0 (B)] = (1 ￿ ￿00)[1 ￿ ￿00 (B)]: Hence







Subtracting (3) from (4) yields ￿00 (B) = ￿0 (B): Substituting into (3) yields ￿00￿￿0 = (￿00 ￿ ￿0)￿00 (B):
Since ￿0 6= ￿00 this implies
￿00 (B) = ￿0 (B) = 1: (5)
Now ￿ (A0nA00) = ￿0￿0 (A0nA00) + (1 ￿ ￿0)[1 ￿ ￿0 (:(A0nA00))] = (1 ￿ ￿00)[1 ￿ ￿00 (:(A0nA00))]:
Thus

















Also ￿ (:(A0nA00)) = ￿0￿0 (:(A0nA00))+(1 ￿ ￿0)[1 ￿ ￿0 (A0nA00)] = ￿00￿00 (:(A0nA00))+(1 ￿ ￿00):
Hence






































Convexity implies 1 = ￿0 (:(A00nA0)) + ￿0 (A00 [ A0) ￿ ￿0 ([A00 [ A0] \ [:(A00nA0)]): By equation
(5), ￿0 (A00 [ A0) = 1; hence ￿0 (:(A00nA0)) = ￿0 (A0): Similarly, ￿00 (A00) = ￿00 (:(A0nA00)). Sub-
stituting into (8) and (9), ￿0 (A0) = ￿0 (A0)￿￿0 (A0nA00)￿￿00 (A00nA0); which implies ￿00 (A00nA0) =
￿0 (A0nA00) = 0: However if s 2 supp￿; then s must have positive capacity ￿(s) > 0: This implies
A00nA0 = A0nA00 = ? and hence A0 = A00:
We conclude this appendix with the proof of Proposition 3.2.
Proof of Proposition 3.2: Clearly ￿￿(?) + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(?) = 0 = ￿ (?) and ￿￿(S￿i) +
31(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(S￿i) = 1 = ￿ (S￿i): If ? & A & S￿i then ￿￿(A) + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(A) = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿ (A) +
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿ (A) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ 1 = ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (A) = ￿ (A):
If ? & A & S￿i then ￿ ￿(:A)￿￿(A) = [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (:A)]￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿ (A) = 1￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿ (A)￿
(1 ￿ ￿)￿ (:A) = ￿ since ￿ (A) + ￿ (:A) = 1:
By de…nition supp￿JP = supp￿: Suppose that ^ s 2 supp￿; then ￿￿ (^ s)+(1 ￿ ￿)p(^ s) > 0 for all
p 2 C (￿); which implies ^ s 2 supp￿: Conversely suppose that ~ s 2 supp￿. Let q be a probability
distribution on S￿i such that q (~ s) = 0: Note that q 2 C (￿0): Since ~ s 2 supp￿;￿￿ (~ s) +
(1 ￿ ￿)q (~ s) > 0; which implies ￿ (~ s) > 0 hence ~ s 2 supp￿: Thus suppJP ￿ = supp￿:
B EXAMPLES
Lemma B.1 In the game of Example 3.1 the neo-additive capacities (b ￿1;b ￿2;b ￿3) with b ￿1((R;X)) =
1; b ￿2((U;Y )) = 1; b ￿3((U;R)) = 1; are an EUA if 3(1 ￿ ￿1) ￿ 5￿1￿1 ￿ 0; 3(1 ￿ ￿2) ￿
5￿2￿2 ￿ 0; holds. If both inequalities are reversed, then there are two pure EUA (e ￿1;e ￿2;e ￿3)
with e ￿1((L;X)) = 1; e ￿2((D;X)) = 1; e ￿3((D;L)) = 1; and (￿ ￿1;￿ ￿2;￿ ￿3) with ￿ ￿1((L;Y )) =
1; ￿ ￿2((D;Y )) = 1; ￿ ￿3((D;L)) = 1:
Proof. Both types of behaviour can be EUA depending on the ambiguity-attitude of the players
and their degrees of ambiguity regarding the behaviour of their opponents.
Representing beliefs by neo-additive capacities, it is not di¢cult to derive the CEU of the
players:
V1(U) = 3[￿1￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿1)￿1(RX;RY )];
V1(D) = 8[￿1￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿1)￿1(RY )] + 1[(1 ￿ ￿1)(￿1(RY;LX;LY ) ￿ ￿1(RY ))];
V2(L) = 8[￿2￿2 + (1 ￿ ￿2)￿2(UX)] + 1[(1 ￿ ￿2)(￿2(UX;DX;DY ) ￿ ￿1(UX))];
V2(R) = 3[￿2￿2 + (1 ￿ ￿2)￿2(UX;UY )];
V3(X) = 3[￿3￿3 + (1 ￿ ￿3)￿3(UR)] + 1[(1 ￿ ￿3)(￿3(UR;DL) ￿ ￿3(UR))];
V3(Y ) = 3[￿3￿3 + (1 ￿ ￿3)￿3(UR)] + 1[(1 ￿ ￿3)(￿3(UR;DL) ￿ ￿3(UR))]:
If (￿1;￿2;￿3) and (￿1;￿2;￿3) satisfy 3(1 ￿ ￿1) ￿ 5￿1￿1 ￿ 0 and 3(1 ￿ ￿2) ￿ 5￿2￿2 ￿ 0; the
neo-additive capacities (b ￿1;b ￿2;b ￿3) with b ￿1((R;X)) = 1; b ￿2((U;Y )) = 1; b ￿3((U;R)) = 1; are an
32EUA, i.e., ? 6= supp^ ￿i ￿ ￿
j6=i
Rj(^ ￿j)
V1(U) ￿ V1(D) = 3(1 ￿ ￿1) ￿ 5￿1￿1 for ￿1((R;X)) = 1;
V2(R) ￿ V2(L) = 3(1 ￿ ￿2) ￿ 5￿2￿2 for ￿2((U;Y )) = 1;
V3(X) ￿ V3(Y ) = 0 for ￿3((U;R)) = 1:
The following beliefs are an EUA




1 ￿ ￿1 for f(R;X)g ￿ E & S￿i;
0 E \ (R;X) = ?,




1 ￿ ￿2 for f(U;Y )g ￿ E & S￿i;
0 E \ (U;Y ) = ?,




1 ￿ ￿3 for f(U;R)g ￿ E & S￿i;
0 E \ (U;R) = ?.
For these beliefs, one obtains the following best responses:




fUg for 3(1 ￿ ￿1) ￿ 5￿1￿1 ￿ 0;
fDg otherwise,




fRg for 3(1 ￿ ￿2) ￿ 5￿2￿2 ￿ 0;
fLg otherwise,
￿ Best reply of Player 3: R3(￿3) = fX;Y g for all ￿3 :
If the conditions in equation (2) both fail, then there are two pure EUA (e ￿1;e ￿2;e ￿3) with
e ￿1((L;X)) = 1; e ￿2((D;X)) = 1; e ￿3((D;L)) = 1; and (￿ ￿1;￿ ￿2;￿ ￿3) with ￿ ￿1((L;Y )) = 1; ￿ ￿2((D;Y )) =
1; ￿ ￿3((D;L)) = 1; which correspond to the standard Nash equilibria of this game.
C GAMES WITH AMBIGUITY
This appendix contains proofs of our existence and comparative statics results and some sup-
plementary results. It uses techniques from Topkis [53].
C.1 Existence
We start with a preliminary de…nition and Lemma.
33De…nition C.1 Suppose that B is a correspondence from a partially ordered set S to a lattice
T such that for all s 2 S;B (s) is a sub-lattice of T; then we say that B is increasing if when








2 B (^ s):
Lemma C.1 Let S be a lattice and let ￿ : S ! S be an increasing correspondence. Then
1. ￿ has a …xed point;
2. supfs : ￿ (s) > sg is the greatest …xed point of ￿:
Proof. Let T = fs : ￿ (s) > sg: Note that T is non-empty since s 2 T ; (where s = minS).





Suppose ~ s 2 T ; then ￿ (~ s) > ~ s: Since ￿ is increasing, ￿ (s0) > ￿ (~ s) and ￿ (s0) > s0 > ~ s: Thus
￿ (￿ (s0)) > ￿ (s0) > s0; which implies ￿ (s0) 2 T and hence s0 > ￿ (s0) > s0:27 The last equation
implies that s0 is a …xed point of ￿: Equation (10) implies that there is no greater …xed point.
Proof of Theorem 3.1 Choose an n-tuple of parameters ￿ = h￿1;:::;￿ni such that ￿ > ￿ >
￿: Let ￿
^ s￿i
i denote the neo-additive capacity on S￿i de…ned by ￿
^ s￿i
i (S￿i) = 1;￿
^ s￿i
i (A) = ￿i￿i;
if ^ s￿i = 2 A;￿
^ s￿i
i (A) = ￿i￿ + 1 ￿ ￿i; otherwise. (Informally ￿
^ s￿i
i represents a situation where i
has an ambiguous belief that his/her opponents will play ^ s￿i:) De…ne Vi (si;s￿i) to be player











+(1 ￿ ￿i)ui (si;s￿i):
Lemma C.6 implies that Vi (si;s￿i) has increasing di¤erences in hsi;s￿ii:
De…ne ￿i (^ s￿i) = argmaxsi2Si Vi (si;s￿i) and ￿ (s) = h￿1 (s￿1);:::;￿n (s￿n)i: Thus ￿i (^ s￿i)
is the best response of player i; if his/her beliefs are a neo-additive capacity which represents
an ambiguous belief that his/her opponents will play ^ s￿i: Since Vi (si;s￿i) has increasing dif-
ferences in hsi;s￿ii; ￿i is an increasing correspondence. (The proof is similar to that of Lemma










0)) = fs : 9~ s 2 ￿ (s
0);s = ￿ (~ s)g:
34equilibrium. By Proposition 3.2, ￿
^ s￿i
i may be written in the form ￿
^ s￿i
i = ￿i￿i + (1 ￿ ￿i) ￿ ￿i;
where ￿i is convex and ￿(￿i) = ￿ (￿i) = ￿i:
C.2 Comparative Statics Proofs
C.2.1 Correspondences on Partially Ordered Sets
This section contains some results about increasing correspondences and selections from them.
Lemma C.2 Suppose that B￿ is an increasing correspondence from a partially ordered set
S to a totally ordered set T for all ￿ in an index set ￿; then ￿ B (s) = max￿2￿ B￿ (s) and
B (s) = min￿2￿ B￿ (s) are increasing functions from S to T:
Proof. Suppose that ^ s > ~ s: Then there exists ~ ￿ 2 ￿ such that ￿ B (~ s) = B~ ￿ (~ s): Since B~ ￿ is
increasing, ￿ B (^ s) < maxB~ ￿ (^ s) < B~ ￿ (~ s) = ￿ B (~ s); which demonstrates that ￿ B is increasing.
There exists ^ ￿ 2 ￿ such that B (^ s) = B^ ￿ (^ s) < minB^ ￿ (^ s): Since B^ ￿ is increasing,
minB^ ￿ (^ s) < minB^ ￿ (~ s): Finally minB^ ￿ (~ s) < B (~ s); which establishes that B (^ s) < B (~ s):
The following two lemmas describe some properties of …xed points of functions on partially
ordered sets.
Lemma C.3 Let S and A be partially ordered sets and let f : S ￿ A ! S be a function which
is increasing in s and ￿: Then the greatest …xed point of f (￿;￿) is an increasing function of ￿:
Proof. Let s(￿) denote the greatest …xed point of f (￿;￿): Since f is increasing in ￿; if ^ ￿ >
~ ￿;fs : f (s; ~ ￿) > sg ￿ fs : f (s; ^ ￿) > sg: Hence s(^ ￿) = supfs : f (s; ^ ￿) > sg > supfs : f (s; ~ ￿) > sg =
s(~ ￿) by Lemma C.1.
C.2.2 Constant Contamination Capacities
Below we de…ne a special case of JP capacities which arise naturally when considering pure
equilibria in games.
De…nition C.2 (Constant Contamination CC) A capacity, ￿~ s
i (￿i;￿i;&i); on S￿i is said to
display constant contamination if it may be written in the form ￿~ s




i (A)+(1 ￿ ￿i)[￿i&i (A) + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿ &i (A)]; where ￿~ s
i denotes the probability distribution28 on
S￿i; which assigns probability 1 to ~ s￿i and &i is a convex capacity with supp&i = ;: To simplify
notation we shall suppress the arguments (￿i;￿i;&i) when it is convenient.
We interpret the capacity ￿i (&i;￿i;￿i) as describing a situation where player i ‘believes’ that
his/her opponents will play the pure strategy pro…le ~ s￿i but lacks con…dence in this belief. The
CC-capacity has a separation between beliefs represented by ￿i; ambiguity-attitude represented
by ￿i and ambiguity represented by &i and ￿i. The parameter ￿i determines the weight the
individual gives to ambiguity. Lower values of ￿i correspond to more ambiguity hence ￿i may
be interpreted as a measure of con…dence in the belief that opponents will play ~ s￿i: The capacity
&i determines which strategy pro…les the player regards as ambiguous. The following result …nds
the support of a CC capacity.
Lemma C.4 Let ￿i = ￿i￿~ s (A) + (1 ￿ ￿i)[￿i&i (A) + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿ &i (A)] be a CC capacity. Then
suppJP ￿i = f^ s￿ig:
Proof. If we de…ne a convex capacity ￿i (A) by ￿i = ￿i￿~ s (A) + (1 ￿ ￿i)&i (A) then ￿i =
￿i￿i + (1 ￿ ￿i) ￿ ￿i. By de…nition suppJP ￿i = supp￿i:
Since ￿i￿~ s (^ s￿i) + (1 ￿ ￿i)p(^ s￿i) > 0 for all p 2 C (&i); ^ s￿i 2 supp￿i: Conversely suppose
that ~ s￿i 2 supp￿i. Then since supp&i = ?; there exists q 2 C (&i) such that q (~ s￿i) = 0: Since
~ s 2 supp￿i;￿i￿~ s (~ s￿i)+(1 ￿ ￿i)q (~ s￿i) > 0; which implies ￿~ s (~ s￿i) > 0 and therefore ~ s￿i = ^ s￿i:
Thus supp￿i = f^ s￿ig:
The following lemma shows that any equilibrium capacity has the constant contamination
form.
Lemma C.5 Let ￿ be a game with positive externalities and let ^ ￿ be a pure equilibrium in JP
capacities of ￿ with equilibrium strategy pro…le ^ s: Then ^ ￿ is a pro…le of CC-capacities, i.e. there
exist convex capacities ￿i;1 6 i 6 n; with supp￿i = ? and ￿i;1 6 i 6 n; such that if we de…ne
￿i = ￿i&i+(1 ￿ ￿i)￿
^ s￿i
i then ￿i = ￿￿i+(1 ￿ ￿i) ￿ ￿i for 1 6 i 6 n: Moreover ￿(￿) = (1 ￿ ￿i)￿(￿)
and ￿ (￿) = (1 ￿ ￿i)￿ (￿):
Proof. Since ^ ￿ is an equilibrium in JP-capacities, we may write the equilibrium beliefs of indi-
vidual i in the form ^ ￿i = ￿i￿i +(1 ￿ ￿i) ￿ ￿i for some convex capacity ￿i: De…ne a capacity ￿i by






1￿￿i ; where ￿i = ￿i (^ s￿i): Then ^ ￿i = ￿i￿
^ s￿i
i (A) + (1 ￿ ￿i)[￿i&i (A) + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿ &i (A)]:
We claim that ￿i is convex. To show this we need to show ￿i (A [ B) > ￿i (A)+￿i (B)￿￿i (A \ B)
for all A;B ￿ S￿i: There are four cases to consider.
If ^ s￿i 2 A and ^ s￿i 2 B; then ￿i (A [ B)+￿i (A \ B) = 1
1￿￿i (￿i (A [ B) + ￿i (A \ B) ￿ 2￿i) >
1
1￿￿i (￿i (A) + ￿i (B) ￿ 2￿i) by convexity of ￿i: Since ￿i (A)+￿i (B) = 1
1￿￿i (￿i (A) + ￿i (B) ￿ 2￿i)
the claim is proved in this case.
If ^ s￿i = 2 A and ^ s￿i = 2 B; then the claim follows from convexity of ￿i; since ￿i = 1
1￿￿i￿i for
all four sets.
If ^ s￿i 2 A and ^ s￿i = 2 B; ￿i (A [ B)+￿i (A \ B) = 1
1￿￿i (￿i (A [ B) ￿ ￿i)+ 1




1￿￿i; by convexity of ￿i: Since ￿i (A)+￿i (B) = 1
1￿￿i (￿i (A) + ￿i (B) ￿ ￿i)
this proves convexity in this case. The remaining case is similar.
Since ￿i is convex and for all s￿i 2 S￿i;￿i (s￿i) = 0 it follows from Proposition A.1 that
supp￿i = ?:
Now consider A & S￿i: Either ^ s￿i 2 A or ^ s￿i 2 :A: Without loss of generality ^ s￿i 2 A.
Then 1 ￿ ￿i (A) ￿ ￿i (:A) = 1 ￿ 1
1￿￿i (￿i (A) ￿ ￿i) ￿ 1
1￿￿i (￿i (:A))
= 1
1￿￿i [1 ￿ ￿i ￿ ￿i (A) + ￿i ￿ ￿i (:A)] = 1
1￿￿i [1 ￿ ￿i (A) ￿ ￿i (:A)]; which implies
(1 ￿ ￿i)￿(￿) = ￿(￿) and (1 ￿ ￿i)￿ (￿) = ￿ (￿):
C.2.3 Increasing/decreasing Di¤erences
Recall that a game, ￿ = hN;(Si); (ui) : 1 6 i 6 ni; has positive aggregate externalities if
ui (si;s￿i) = ui (si;fi (s￿i)); for 1 6 i 6 n, where ui is increasing (resp. decreasing) in fi and
fi : S￿i ! R is increasing in all arguments. Since S￿i is …nite, we may enumerate the possible
values of fi; f0
i < ::: < fM
i : Since f is increasing f0
i = f (s1;:::;sn) and fM
i = f (￿ s1;:::; ￿ sn): The
Choquet integral of ui (si;s￿i) with respect to capacity ￿i on S￿i may be written in the form:
Vi (si) =
Z
ui (si;s￿i)d￿i = ui (si;fM)￿i (HM) +
M￿1 X
r=0
ui (si;fr)[￿i (Hr) ￿ ￿i (Hr+1)];
where Hr denotes the event fs￿i 2 S￿i : f (s￿i) > frg:
De…ne Wi (si; ~ s￿i;￿i;￿i;&i) to be player i’s (Choquet) expected payo¤ given that his/her
37beliefs are represented by the capacity ￿~ s￿i
i (A;￿i;￿i;&i) i.e.





= (1 ￿ ￿i)ui (si; ~ s￿i) + ￿i￿i
Z
ui (si;s￿i)d&i + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿i
Z
ui (si;s￿i)d￿ &i:















ui (si;s￿i)d&i+(1 ￿ ￿i)￿i
R




























increasing in si since ui has increasing di¤erences in si;s￿i:
Lemma C.7 The function Wi (si;s￿i;￿i;￿i;&i) satis…es decreasing di¤erences in si;￿i:
Proof. Suppose s0
i > s00
i ; then Wi (s0





i;s￿i)d&i + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿i
R
ui (s0





i ;s￿i)d&i ￿ (1 ￿ ￿i)￿i
R
ui (s00























i ;s￿i)d￿ &i + (1 ￿ ￿i)ui (s00
i ;s￿i):
It is su¢cient to show that the coe¢cient of ￿i is positive. Since there are positive aggregate



























































































































[￿ &i (Hr) ￿￿ &i (Hr+1)]: (11)
Now ui (s0
i;s￿i)￿ui (s00
i ;s￿i) is an increasing function of si: Equation (11) is the di¤erence of two
weighted sums of ui (s0
i;s￿i) ￿ ui (s00
i ;s￿i). The weights in the …rst sum are …rst order stochas-
38tically dominated by those in the second, (proved below). Thus the …rst sum is smaller which
makes the overall expression negative. This establishes that Wi (s0
i;s￿i;￿i) ￿ Wi (s00
i ;s￿i;￿i) is
a decreasing function of ￿i:









[&i (Hr) ￿ &i (Hr+1)] = &i (HM￿k+1):








r=M￿k+1 [￿ &i (Hr) ￿￿ &i (Hr+1)]







r=M￿k+1 &i (:Hr+1) ￿ &i (:Hr) = 1 ￿ &i (:HM￿k+1):
Since &i is convex, &i (HM￿k+1) 6 1￿&i (:HM￿k+1); which establishes …rst order stochastic
dominance.
Lemma C.8 The the best response correspondence of player i; Bi (^ s￿i;￿i;￿i;&i); de…ned by
Bi (s￿i;￿i;￿i;&i) = argmaxsi2Si Wi (si;s￿i;￿i;￿i;&i) is increasing in s￿i and decreasing in ￿i:
Proof. To show Bi (s￿i;￿i;￿i;&i) is increasing in s￿i; assume ^ s￿i > ~ s￿i: Consider y 2
Bi (~ s￿i;￿i;￿i;&i);z 2 Bi (^ s￿i;￿i;￿i;&i) and let m = minfy;zg and M = maxfy;zg: Now
Wi (y; ~ s￿i;￿i;￿i;&i) > Wi (z; ~ s￿i;￿i;￿i;&i) which implies Wi (M; ~ s￿i;￿i;￿i;&i) > Wi (z; ~ s￿i;￿i;￿i;&i):
By increasing di¤erences, Wi (M; ^ s￿i;￿i;￿i;&i) > Wi (z; ^ s￿i;￿i;￿i;&i); hence M 2 Bi (^ s￿i;￿i;&i):
Since Wi (m; ^ s￿i;￿i;￿i;&i) ￿ Wi (z; ^ s￿i;￿i;￿i;&i) 6 0; increasing di¤erences implies
Wi (m; ~ s￿i;￿i;￿i;&i)￿Wi (z; ~ s￿i;￿i;￿i;&i) 6 0: Thus Wi (m; ~ s￿i;￿i;￿i;&i) > Wi (y; ~ s￿i;￿i;￿i;&i)
and hence m 2 Bi (~ s￿i;￿i;￿i;&i): This establishes that Bi (s￿i;￿i;￿i;&i) is increasing in s￿i:
We may establish that Bi (s￿i;￿i;&i) is decreasing in ￿i by a similar argument.
De…nition C.3 The maximal and minimal best response correspondences of player i are de…ned
respectively by
￿ Bi (s￿i;￿i;￿i;￿i;￿i) = max
￿i
￿
Bi (s￿i;￿i;￿i;￿i);8A ￿ S￿i;
￿i
1 ￿ ￿i





Bi (s￿i;￿i;￿i;￿i;￿i) = min
￿i
￿
Bi (s￿i;￿i;￿i;￿i);8A ￿ S￿i;
￿i
1 ￿ ￿i





It follows from Lemma C.5 that the maximal best response correspondence is the greatest
39best response to all beliefs whose support is the pure strategy s￿i with minimal (resp. maximal)
degree of ambiguity is at least ￿ (resp. at most ￿):
Proof of Theorem 4.1 We shall only prove the result for the highest equilibrium strat-
egy. The lowest equilibrium strategy can be covered by a similar argument. Lemma C.5
establishes that if ^ s is an equilibrium strategy pro…le when the minimal (resp. maximal) de-
gree of ambiguity is ￿ (resp. ￿); then there exist ￿i with ￿i
1￿￿i > ￿i (A) + ￿i (:A) >
￿i
1￿￿i
such that ^ si 2 Bi (s￿i;￿i;￿i) for 1 6 i 6 n: Thus any given equilibrium satisfying these con-
straints is smaller than the largest …xed point of the maximal best response correspondence
￿ Bi (s￿i;￿i;￿i;￿i):
Therefore since ￿ s(￿) is the pro…le of greatest equilibrium strategies it is the largest …xed
point of the maximal best response function, i.e. ￿ s(￿) 2 ￿ B (s; ￿ ￿) and s(￿) 2 B (s;￿): By
Lemma C.8, ￿ Bi (^ s￿is￿i;￿i;￿i;￿i) is increasing in s￿i and decreasing ￿i: It follows from Lemma
C.3 that ￿ s(￿) is decreasing in ￿:
C.2.4 Multiple Equilibria
In this section we show that equilibrium is unique if there is su¢cient ambiguity.
Lemma C.9 Consider a game, ￿; of positive externalities and increasing di¤erences. There
exists ￿ ￿ such that if the minimal degree of ambiguity is ￿ (￿i) > ￿ ￿, then in any equilibrium ￿ =






+ (1 ￿ ￿i)ui (si; ￿ s￿i)
￿
;
for 1 6 i 6 n:
































Although in general ￿r
￿i 6= sr
￿i; positive externalities implies that s1
￿i = ￿1
￿i = ￿ s￿i and sR
￿i =
￿R
￿i = s￿i: Suppose that the beliefs of individual i may be represented by a JP-capacity, ￿i =
￿i￿i + (1 ￿ ￿i) ￿ ￿i: If i plays strategy ^ si (s)he receives utility:
Vi (^ si) = ￿i
R
ui (^ si;s￿i)d￿i + (1 ￿ ￿i)
R
















































































































Similarly if i plays strategy ~ si (s)he receives utility:

































































+(1 ￿ ￿i)ui (~ si; ￿ s￿i): Since










+ (1 ￿ ￿i)ui (~ si; ￿ s￿i)
￿
> 0: It
follows that ~ si will not be played when ￿ ￿ is su¢ciently high,.
Proof of Proposition 4.1 By Lemma C.9, if the minimal degree of ambiguity is su¢-






+ (1 ￿ ￿i)ui (si; ￿ s￿i)
￿
; for 1 6 i 6 n: If ￿i





argmaxsi2Si ui (si; ￿ s￿i)). By Theorem 4.1 the resulting equilibrium is smaller (resp. greater)
than the lowest (resp. highest) equilibrium without ambiguity.
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